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Book Review
Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A
Story of Dependence, Corruption
and Virtue, by Jeanine Grenberg
Philip J. Rossi
Department of Theology, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Jeanine Grenberg’s carefully crafted case in defense of humility
as a central human virtue starts (Chapter 1) with an account of
Kantian rational agency in which dependency and corruption mark
fundamental limits to human moral capacities. She then offers a
general picture of a Kantian theory of virtue (Chapters 2 and 3) that is
consonant with this construal of moral agency as dependent and
corrupt. Grenberg notes that her Kantian based view involves at least
one important contrast with Aristotelian theories—rather than
understanding virtues primarily in terms of excellences, a “Kantian
approach to virtue is . . . in part necessarily ameliorative” (p. 79)—but
she also argues for important parallels. These include both a
counterpart to Aristotelian character traits, articulated in a Kantian
understanding of virtues as principled, and a Kantian thesis on behalf
of the unity of the virtues. Grenberg then offers (Chapter 4) an
analysis and response to recent accounts of humility (e.g., by Stephen
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Hare, Norvin Richards, G. F. Scheuler, David Statman) to which her
basic objection is that they “have generally rejected any appeal to
human nature to ground the state [of humility]” and, in so doing, have
turned to a “behavioristic definition of humility” that relies “upon selfother comparison as a standard for self-evaluation” (p. 111). Her
constructive account of “the Kantian virtue of humility” (Chapters 5, 6,
and 7) treats it as “that meta-attitude which constitutes the moral
agent’s proper perspective on herself as a dependent and corrupt but
capable and dignified rational agent” (p. 133). A principal concern in
this account is to provide, through appeal to Kantian notions of
interest, moral feeling, and respect, a plausible alternative to “the
comparative-competitive model of humility.” In spelling out this
alternative, Grenberg advances theses about the ways in which
humility and a proper self-respect regarding one’s own moral agency
mutually condition each other and argues, in addition, for taking moral
exemplars to have a more important function for moral growth and
education than is typically associated with Kant’s views. Grenberg then
concludes her case by exploring (Chapters 8 and 9) “humility’s relation
to the obligatory end of perfection of self” and “how humility is
relevant to the obligatory end [i.e., beneficence] relative to others” (p.
217).
There are at least three levels on which Grenberg’s work
provides bases for significant engagement. First, it can be engaged as
an exercise in virtue ethics that, by its own enactment of a modestly
advanced and gently persuasive case, not only brings humility back
from the margins of discussion, but also suggests that its restoration
to a more central place in the life of the virtues is of considerable
importance for truthfully undertaking the moral responsibilities we
have to ourselves and to one another. Second, it can be engaged as
an exercise in Kant interpretation that challenges once widely accepted
views that placed an almost unbridgeable chasm between Kantian
ethics as deontological and most forms of virtue ethics. Third, it can be
engaged as an exercise in moral anthropology (or a moral ontology of
human agency) which opens lines of potentially useful conversation
with theological ethics and theological anthropology. A remark about
the first level will serve as introduction to comments about the other
two; the pivotal point of engagement in all of these is Grenberg’s
commitment, for which I am in full sympathy, to provide an “account
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of humility [that] will not abandon questions of human nature” (p.
111).
Both a sense of self-respect that is not keyed to comparison
with others and a mutually supportive relationship between selfrespect and respect for others are key elements in Grenberg’s
construal of humility as a Kantian virtue. She puts both points to
effective use in her necessarily compact treatment (Chapters 8 and 9)
of the two main divisions of what Kant terms “the duties of virtue,”
viz., duties to oneself and duties to others. Her engagement with these
points through illustrative use of Cordelia from King Lear and Alyosha
from The Brother Karamazov shows great sensitivity to the complexity
of the human social relationships in which humility needs to function.
The latter example—Alyosha’s abortive attempt to make amends to
Snegirev for the public insult inflicted on him by Alyosha’s brother
Dmitri—takes cognizance of the fact that matters of social status and
disparity of power distort both Alyosha’s and Snegirev’s reading of
what the situation demands morally in terms of both their own selfrespect and their respect for one another. Though both are eventually
able to correct their prior distorted judgments (discussed in detail on
pp. 243–50) so as to act toward each other in accord with the
“humble beneficence” of moral equals, Grenberg’s account does not
raise the questions of whether or how humility in its Kantian guise
provides any purchase from which a moral agent might address the
structural social disparities that cloud proper recognition of one
another as moral equals. My suspicion is that there may be useful
resources in Grenberg’s construal of Kantian moral agency and in her
mutual referencing of self-respect and respect for others to the
“untrumpable value of moral principles” (p. 161) that open possibilities
for dealing with such structural issues. It may also be the case that
both identifying and utilizing those resources will require addressing
the larger issues that arise in bringing an ethics of virtue to bear upon
the dynamics of shaping just structures for human society—issues that
can be posed in Kantian terms as the task of exhibiting more explicitly
what constitutes the unity of the moral demands articulated in a
“doctrine of right” with those articulated in a “doctrine of virtue” in an
account of moral agency.
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This consideration about the mutual relation of self-respect and
respect for others within the unity of human moral agency is relevant
to the two other levels on which Grenberg’s work deserves thoughtful
engagement. It is no longer surprising to see an interpretation of
Kant’s ethics in which concepts once taken to be outside the scope of
his intense focus on right, duty and the autonomous exercise of
human freedom—e.g., teleology, character, and virtue—are
reintroduced as important coordinates within his moral theory. Within
the context of such “revisionist” readings of Kant’s ethics, Grenberg’s
particular contribution does not lie simply in its eff ort to provide a
detailed case for taking Kant as both as an important point of
reference for general discussions of virtue and as insightful expositor
of the principles that inform a morally rich concept of humility. Of at
least equal importance in my judgment is her affirmation that an
account of human agency that is conceptually and morally adequate
needs to be referenced to an understanding of human nature that is
not merely empirical and behavioral. Grenberg’s interpretation is thus
consonant with renewed interest a number of Kant interpreters have
recently taken in the role that anthropology plays in Kant’s critical
project. It further suggests that any answer to the question of the
unity of the “doctrine of right” and the “doctrine of virtue” will, of
necessity, require an account of the human subject/agent as the locus
in which the unity of finite, embodied reason is constituted.
This brings us full circle back to Grenberg’s starting point in
Kant’s account of finite human rational agency as dependent and
corrupt that is given its most notable exposition in Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason. She articulates that account as “a general
claim about the human condition: human beings are desiring and
needy beings who tend in a whole variety of ways to value the self
improperly relative to other objects of moral value” (p. 48). In a
manner that is faithful to Kant’s own careful parsing of the differences
between the moral and the religious and between the philosophical
and the theological, Grenberg tries to provide “a philosophically
respectable, and not necessarily religious, account of a transcendent
standard, and the limits of human nature in the face of it” as the
context in which to make the case for the centrality of humility for a
virtuous human life (p. 140). This careful eschewing of paths that lead
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to the theological—a move that allows affirmation of a “secular (at
times gentler), but always radical evil”—respects the a-theological
(and even anti-theological) perspectives informing many of the
interlocutors her work explicitly engages (p. 42).
I hope, however, that this is does not become the end of
Grenberg’s “story of dependence, corruption and virtue,” because
there is reason to think that her work offers something of value for the
project of constructing philosophical and theological anthropologies
that can reckon with the fractured aftermath of modernity. Grenberg
makes a promising start in the direction of providing what Charles
Taylor calls an “anthropology of situated freedom” (Sources of the
Self, p. 515) in her depiction of “the challenge of the human condition”
as “the task of learning to love the self well, that is to love the self in a
way that does not undermine our equally inherent end of being moral”
(p. 48). The theological crux here, of course, is the extent to which
such a properly ordered love of self is only possible in view of first
being loved by God.
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